

By Joshua Lederberg

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THE STRATEGIC arms limitation talks (SALT), which will resume next month in Helsinki, have been labeled the key to world survival through the next decade. Even if we frame the arms race as a byproduct of international politics rather than as a living, demoniacal being with independent existence, no one doubts the value of a critical search for practical limitations on the arms spiral.

Arms investment is shaped by dynamic interplay of domestic and international forces, actions and reactions, as much as by negotiated agreements. More than any other process, nevertheless, these explicit agreements require us to examine the assumptions that underlie our strategies of defense and of conciliation.

In my own view the most important function of the arms limitation conferences is their educational value for the participants, so that the many internal policy-making forces within each country may better understand the full depth of their national interests, and how these may be pursued in the light of the perceptions of the other nations. It would then be a mistake, as Fred Ikle stressed for other reasons in "How Nations Negotiate," to judge the value of diplomatic negotiations solely in terms of the agreements formally concluded.

Economic Factors


IN THE EYES of the poor countries, our commitment to the arms race has drained the very resources that might finance international development. Their political pressure (like an implicit threat that India might join the nuclear club) is certainly among the main forces that have dragged the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the conference tables in Vienna, Helsinki and Geneva.

Whether the pattern of arms limitation now under negotiation within the SALT framework will result in much savings from arms budgets is problematical. This benefit may be a long-range consequence of the political stability that is the central aim of strategic policy. In the short run, there is more likely to be only a shifting of expenditures to the programs left out of the agreements.

The obvious, and in many ways desirable, contender here is the naval option. Despite its expense as a launch platform, the submarine has long been advocated as the way to separate the retaliatory force from vulnerable cities, and to provide another resource for assured destruction of an attacker.

Missile-launching surface ships, despite their vulnerability, may also be undeservedly neglected as inexpensive decoys and early-warning lures to dilute an enemy's first strike capability. The mix of cheap, vulnerable platforms must, however, be carefully calibrated in order not to be confused with a force useful only for a first strike. There will be no lack of alternative proposals, some quite plausible, to buy more reliability and to plug potential gaps in systems dedicated to infinite security.

Another stated argument for arms control is that the very accumulation of the stockpile, with its vast potential for overkill, makes it more likely that nuclear war will break out. There is a core of rationality to this argument. The



America's first two nuclear submarines—the Nautilus, right, and the Seawolf—docked at Groton,

Conn. The submarine's retaliatory force

technology of nuclear weapons is likely to leak and proliferate in some proportion to the total effort devoted to them. The nonproliferation treaty would have been unnecessary if every nonnuclear country had first had to finance a Manhattan project to learn to make a bomb. Furthermore, the chance of an unauthorized psychotic or accidental firing with its potentially catastrophic consequences, is larger the more weapons abound, other things being equal.

As to "overkill," the metaphor makes sense for a first-strike capability — a small percentage of the stockpile of either superpower could wipe out civilization — but a credible deterrent must still be perceived as inflicting a pre-emptive attack. Overkill potential is exactly what stabilizes the system to make unlikely the actual use in anger of a nuclear weapon.

From this point of view, it is pointless to discuss nuclear parity or sufficiency or superiority in terms of numbers of missiles, which is the fashionable game. The accuracy of intelligence about the location of missile launch sites, the precision of guidance, the shrewdness of target selection, the security of command and control, and above all how well these are perceived by an enemy and by ourselves—these now become far more crucial to deterrence than an advertisement of crude numbers of missiles or of warheads. The essential function of strategic arms is to ensure that they will never be used by either side, and that any threat of their use works to stabilize rather than to inflame the relations of competing nations.

Will Stalemate Last?

THE ARMS RACE having progressed to an effective stalemate, which has worked better than anyone could have hoped 25 years ago, its main hazards today come from its side effects on both international and national policies. The most serious of


these is an unremitting anxiety and suspicion about possible technical breakthroughs that might break the stalemate.

At one level, this leads to the mutual reinforcement of distrust about each side's intentions and plans. At another it provokes the constant search for the technology to do it first here. The main argument openly leveled by most academic physicists against the ABM is that it simply will not do any of the several jobs for which it is purportedly designed. The real force of their anxiety is that a long-range program of ABM research might eventually develop methods that more credibly offer a prospect of antimissile defense.

Needless to say, it would be comforting to devise a world in which defense had a real margin over attack, but how do we get there except through closely monitored mutual agreements? In the process, the existing balance will be broken, and we will face the most serious risks of either side's feeling compelled to undertake a pre-emptive attack. At the very least both sides would strive to redouble their offensive weaponry in order to sustain the credibility of their retaliatory potential.

Effective defense against missiles evidently remains quite remote, but it might be technically achieved at the far end of an extensive program of trial and development, of which Safeguard is the first step. This is a technological "Race to Oblivion," the history of which has been authoritatively documented in Dr. Herbert York's recent book of that title.

Dr. York recounts how the arms race mentality was exploited with great skill and mendacity in the 1960s to fund redundant and useless weapons systems, and to ensure that each of the services in an imperfectly unified defense establishment would be placated.



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marine is one way of separating the from vulnerable cities.

He believes, as I do, that the security of the country depends only in part on technical innovation, and that we must address our greater efforts to stabilizing the security of the world if we are to have any for ourselves.

But we cannot overlook the need for technological creativity, which will rapidly disappear if we do not repair the sources of the cynicism of our youth about the legitimacy of our national goals. By building so heavily on technological bases of security, while neglecting the causes of internal disaffection, we have impaired our military security far more than any missile deficit would imply.

Sputnik Overrated

MUTUAL MISPERCEPTIONS of strategic posture undoubtedly fueled the gravest international confrontation to date, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Dr. York recalls how we grossly overrated the military significance of Sputnik in 1957. The Soviets had, in fact, overbuilt their rockets in a way that suited them for space flight but slowed up their deployment in strategically significant numbers. The missile gap myth of the 1960 election campaign was based on vastly inflated estimates of the Soviet operational capability. This is a difficulty inherent in any intelligence organization, which will never be criticized as much for drawing the most extensive implications out of fragmentary data as it would be for overlooking any possibility.

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., in his "A Thousand Days," makes the curious remark that the Soviets in 1960 were "innocent of the higher calculus of deterrence as recently developed in the U.S." Therefore, they could not comprehend the stabilizing purpose of President Kennedy's plans to enhance U.S. missilery. Knowing the actual strength of their own forces, they may

in fact have viewed Kennedy's missile program in the same way that Secretary Laird construes the SS-9s, namely the development of a first strike potential that could smother the ability to retaliate.

"Too bad, that's their problem!," some might say. But that confusion may explain Khrushchev's Cuban gambit, a desperate move that would have been senseless as a direct strategic threat against the United States—provided the Russians really had an ample long-range missile force based on their own soil.

When your opponent has nuclear weapons, his jitters are your problem, too.

An Overdrawn Parable

IN 1961, THE LATE Leo Szilard wrote a fictional parable, "The Mined Cities," wherein the superpowers had exchanged the capability of assured destruction by allowing the major cities to be mined by the other side. The idea has been revived from time to time—but like Rep. Craig Hosmer's suggestion that we multiply world security by giving every country four A-bombs—it does an ingenious metaphor the worst injustice to take it too literally. The parable does point out that our cities are hostages to one another, whether the bombs are underground or need to be delivered by a 30-minute rocket flight. (This reasoning also makes one question whether Moscow and Washington are the right cities to be shielded with ABMs, when the potentates would make the most credible hostages.) Why not then agree that the problem of mutual security has some technical solution, achievable at the lowest mutual cost?

The establishment of a Soviet missile base in Cuba, or American bombers in Libya, entailed political complications almost as unacceptable as giving extraterritorial access into the U.S. capital to a Soviet bomb squad. And where would we fit the French and the Chinese?

The nondeployment of a potential ABM system is a constructive equivalent to cheapening the hostage system, with the fewest side effects. MIRVs (multiple warhead missiles) complicate the deterrence equations, giving the first-striker a better chance to destroy a deterrent, but the naval option and a multiplication of feints are as plausible answers as any foreseeable ABM. As far as arms control is concerned, once the potential for MIRV was understood, little room was left for any verifiable control over its further development. Indeed, the need to play out this act so that both sides could work out the implications of MIRV may have compelled the postponement of SALT until now.

If we separate the gimmickry from the parable behind "The Mined Cities," we can see that the naval options may give us the greatest room for mutual advantage. Ironical schemes can be composed that point up some of the absurdities of the world system. For example, it would be more to our advantage if Soviet submarines refueled at Portland, Maine, rather than at Cienfuegos, Cuba; and we might offer to exchange base privileges on U.S. shores for their equivalent on the Black and Baltic Seas.

But even if such superrational exchanges could be negotiated, they would raise untold mischief through disputes over the interpretation of the guaranteed free access on which they would have to be based. Better that we work out a de facto equilibrium, provided that this is based on the clear

understanding that any solution must provide for a zone of strategic security on both sides, or nothing but desperate maneuvering can follow.

Working Out the Bugs

THE GREATEST ANXIETY about surprise attack in the next decade—for both sides are in fact expanding the naval option—is that new technology may impair the invulnerability of the submarine. It is absolutely inconceivable that antisubmarine detection and warfare could reach the point of reliably removing the bulk of a retaliatory force in a single surprise attack, without having first been widely exercised and tested. Mutually advantageous agreements to limit such testing should be fairly amenable to verification. They could be a logical extension of the existing ban on testing nuclear weapons under water.

There is also a danger that units of the naval strategic force may become involved in tactical conflicts, with a consequent erosion of the line that marks nuclear weapons off from all others. This will require very careful attention to our own doctrine.

The problem of surprise attack can be formulated in more precise, quantitative terms than any other aspect of defense strategy. There are still many uncertainties, for example the operational reliability of immense computer programs, and the level of nuclear retaliation that would be so "unacceptable" to a potential attacker as to deter him. Nevertheless, the analyst can make a fairly simple model of the array of forces, and ignore the complexities of mass psychology and serpentine recalculation that blur the scientific predictability of any political confrontation.

The simplicity of the problem to the rational analyst, and its appeal to the paranoia of the antirational, have captured our attention and resources out of proportion to the role of surprise attack in world conflict. By overdesigning our solutions to that problem, we leave ourselves ever less prepared to cope with the actual difficulties of today's world.

What to Do?

ALL SIDES ARE approaching the conclusion that mutual defense against surprise attack needlessly consumes an inordinate portion of world resources. We seek a new pattern of reciprocal arms disposal whose very momentum would be the best assurance that it was not merely a gambit for strategic advantage. This would be hard to construct, merely against the fears, angers and entrenched interests of important elements within both superpowers.

A simple moratorium on the emplacement of strategic weapons has been suggested, but it is likely to be entangled in contentious differences over whether it should embrace aircraft, tactical missiles, and so on.

From a technical standpoint, the most amenable place for controls is testing; a comprehensive freeze on all missile tests would be most easily verified, and would provide the utmost assurance against the perpetuation of a costly technology. However, none of these require precise re-entry after a brief, high velocity flight. Furthermore, nothing would be lost in requiring a definite pattern of international participation in space missions to assure that these were a net benefit to the whole earth from which they have embarked.